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Abstract This article investigates relationships between
countries’ legal traditions and their quality of life as
measured by a number of widely reported social indicators;
in so doing it also offers a critique of a highly influential
body of work which is widely cited in the literatures of
corporate governance, economics and finance. That body
of work has shown, inter alia, statistically significant
relationships between legal traditions and various proxies
for investor protection. We show statistically significant
relationships between legal traditions and various proxies
for societal health. Our comparative evidence suggests that
the interests of investors are not congruent with the inter-
ests of wider society, and that the criteria for judging the
effectiveness of approaches to corporate governance should
be broadened.
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Introduction
The most influential contribution to the literature on
international corporate governance (Solomon 2007) is that
made in a series of papers by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (see, for example, La Porta et al.
1996, 1997a, 1998, 2000a, b, 2002, 2006, 2008; Shleifer
and Vishny 1997). The extent of their contribution to the
fields of banking, economics, finance and law is also
particularly noteworthy. According to ‘‘in-cites’’ (an edi-
torial component of Essential Science Indicators pub-
lished by Thomson Scientific), the four most influential
authors in the world in the area of economics and banking
in 2007 were Shleifer (with 3,765 citations), Lopez-De-
Silanes (with 2,396 citations), La Porta (with 2,394 cita-
tions) and Vishny (with 1,531 citations). In a recent
classification of the most cited articles in finance from
2000 to 2006, three of the top five papers are contribu-
tions by this group (Keloharju 2008). Their key papers
have influenced research across disciplinary boundaries
being ‘‘some of the most-cited pieces in economics,
finance and law’’ (Siems 2005). Referring specifically to
La Porta et al. (1998), Braendle (2006) states that this
article ‘‘has been and is still cited frequently and usually
uncritically, in legal as well as in economic journals’’
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(p. 261) and ‘‘[it] is a standard reference in comparative
corporate and financial law’’ (p. 263).1
La Porta et al. investigated, in particular, relationships
between legal traditions and corporate governance systems,
especially with regard to differing levels of investor pro-
tection and their consequences. Their early papers (La
Porta et al. 1997a, 1998) developed the proposition that
stock market size and consequent economic development
were promoted by a legal system which protected the
interests of outside investors against appropriation by
insiders; and they viewed this argument, following Jensen
and Meckling (1976), as a natural consequence of a
‘‘contractual view of the firm’’ (La Porta et al. 2008). They
are now widely identified with the presumption that com-
mon law legal traditions lead to better economic outcomes
than those based on civil law.
In this article, we highlight the arguably narrow ethical
perspective underpinning their work by widening their
analysis to consider social as well as economic outcomes.
Such an extension of their findings is, we feel, particularly
important, given the wide ranging and largely unques-
tioning use to which their results have been put; for
example, Braendle (2006) claims that ‘‘the blindfold cita-
tion’’ of La Porta et al.’s 1998 paper ‘‘seems very com-
mon’’ (p. 278). See also, for example, Chui et al. (2002).
In particular, it is arguable that their work has contrib-
uted to the marginalisation of a stakeholder orientated
approach to corporate governance which tends to be
identified with practice in civil law countries. For example,
Dignam and Galanis (2008) claim that a significant turning
point in the stakeholder/shareholder debate within the
governance literature was marked by the publication of the
series of papers in the late 1990s by La Porta et al.
According to Dignam and Galanis (2008, p. 3) ‘‘their work
contributed significantly to later claims for the superiority
of the outsider system’’. In this sense, their work has played
a significant part in the development of a conventional
wisdom that the ‘‘Anglo-American’’ shareholder-value
oriented form of corporate governance is the model to
which other jurisdictions should conform (see, for example,
La Porta et al. 2008; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Collison
2003; Hansmann and Kraakman 2001). For example,
Milhaupt (2005, p. 2199) notes that the central explanation
from La Porta et al.’s body of work is that ‘‘common law
systems appear to provide better investor protections than
civil law-particularly French civil law-systems. It is plau-
sible that as a result, the Anglo-American economies have
larger capital markets and faster economic growth than
economies supported by European civil law’’.2 The claims
of La Porta et al. which have been characterised as the
‘‘legal origins hypothesis’’ have also been significant for
policy formulation. According to Ahlering and Deakin
(2007, p. 866), their claims have been: ‘‘highly influential,
not least in informing the policy and working methods of
the World Bank and other international financial institu-
tions’’. Furthermore, Armour et al. (2010), notwithstanding
their view that La Porta et al.’s methods are contestable,
state that the ‘‘legal origins hypothesis is one of the most
important and influential ideas to emerge in the social
sciences in the past decade’’ (p. 2).
In sum, La Porta et al.’s statistical analysis has shown
that the origin of a country’s legal system is associated with
levels of investor protection, and the degree to which its
capital markets are developed. They show that countries
sharing a common law legal tradition (such as UK, US and
the other developed English-speaking economies) have
greater levels of investor protection, larger capital markets
with more dispersed ownership, and a greater propensity
for funds to be committed to new enterprises by external
investors. In La Porta et al. (1998), the authors also draw on
other literature to show that such phenomena are associated
with greater economic growth. In more recent work,
however, La Porta et al. (2008) noted, citing Glaeser et al.
(2004), that ‘‘the evidence on the relationship between
institutions and aggregate growth more generally, which
seemed substantial a few years ago, has been crumbling’’
(p. 302). Indeed, Ahlering and Deakin (2007) robustly state
that there is ‘‘no sound basis for the argument that the
common law is more conducive to economic growth than
the civil law (p. 868). Notwithstanding such observations,
the main edifice of the La Porta et al. work is still regarded
as robust by its authors: ‘‘our framework suggests that the
common law approach to social control of economic life
performs better than the civil law approach’’ (La Porta
et al. 2008, p. 327).
1 Two citation indexes were consulted in order to provide an
overview of the influence of La Porta et al.’s research, in particular,
their 1997a and 1998 studies. In January 2010, a search of the ISI
Web of Knowledge citation database yielded 831 citations for La
Porta et al. (1997) and 1,291 for La Porta et al. (1998). A similar
search on Harzing’s Publish or Perish programme (Jan 2010),
downloaded at http://www.harzing.com/, yielded 2,729 and 3,975
citations, respectively. The ISI web of knowledge database is drawn
from a selected group of influential journals, while The Publish or
Perish programme uses data from Google Scholar. According to
Keloharju (2008), a Publish or Perish search is more reliable for the
assessment of a paper’s impact, since it includes both published
articles and working papers. Arguably, the influence of this group of
authors extends beyond citations to their published research. For
example, both La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes have been the economic
advisors to the National Banking and Stock Market Commission in
Mexico. Further, Lopez-de-Silanes has held advisory/consultancy
roles with The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
2 Milhaupt (2005, p. 2199) adds, ‘‘The genius of Delaware law - the
best of the best - shines bright in the wake of this literature. Not
surprisingly, commentators are beginning to explore ways to adapt
features of Delaware law to foreign systems’’.
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In this article, we revisit some of the key statistical
findings reported by La Porta et al., widen the work’s scope
and reveal that the civil and common-law traditions which
they highlight also show statistically significant associa-
tions, amongst developed economies, with various mea-
sures of societal well-being. We call into question the
criteria used by La Porta et al. for assessing laws as
‘‘poor’’, by taking a broader perspective on a country’s
performance than one which focuses on financial and
economic metrics. We also consider the differences
between common and civil law to suggest a rationale for
the results that we find, and for those reported by La Porta
et al. In particular, we draw on arguments developed by
Berle and Means (1932) regarding the provenance and
implications of civil and common-law traditions. Our main
focus in this article is on two of the earlier La Porta et al.
papers, especially La Porta et al. (1997a) and also La Porta
et al. (1998). Not only are these two of their most cited
pieces of work, but also the structure of the 1997 paper
serves as a convenient basis for the statistical comparison
that is at the heart of this article. While our main focus is
on the 1997 paper,3 we will also adduce perspectives and
more recent findings from their later work4 especially La
Porta et al. (2008).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In
the next section, we outline relevant parts of the La Porta
et al. work and the reference they make to the classic
agency analysis of Berle and Means (1932); we also con-
sider evidence of their influence in the corporate gover-
nance literature. The subsequent section considers the
relevance of social indicators as a method of assessing a
country’s well-being, and reports our analysis of certain
indicators using the same method of country classification
(i.e. one based on legal origin) as that used, in particular, by
La Porta et al. (1996, 1997a, 1998). In that section, we
reproduce material contained in La Porta et al. (1997a).
The final section considers possible explanations for our
findings based on the nature of the common and civil law
legal traditions and offers some conclusions. Our funda-
mental aim in this article is to investigate, by drawing on
the work of La Porta et al., the evidence for a relationship
between countries’ legal traditions and their quality of life
as measured by certain social indicators. A complementary
aim is to challenge the extremely influential conclusions
reached by La Porta et al. regarding the putative superiority
of the common law, or Anglo-American, approach to ‘‘the
social control of economic life’’.
Common and Civil Law Legal Traditions and the Work
of La Porta et al.
In the introduction to this article, we suggested that the
work of La Porta et al. lends itself to normative arguments
in support of an approach to corporate governance based on
a narrow agency theory perspective (Dignam and Galanis
2008; Milhaupt 2005). This is consistent with the Anglo-
American, shareholder value-based model of capitalism as
opposed to a stakeholder or social market-based approach.
The ‘‘varieties of capitalism’’ literature (see, for example,
Hall and Soskice 2001; Dore 1999, 2000, 2006; Hutton
1995, 2003) is extensive and a substantive review of it
would go beyond the scope of this article. But it seems
apposite to note that, in their much cited work, Hall and
Soskice (2001) take a ‘‘firm-centered’’ approach and regard
‘‘companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist economy’’
(p. 6). They apply micro level concepts to help understand
the macro economy. Hall and Soskice draw a distinction
between the two types of political economies, which they
term as liberal market economies and coordinated market
economies, respectively. While they describe these ideal
types as ‘‘poles of a spectrum’’ they broadly correspond to
the classification used in this article between Anglo-
American and social market forms of capitalism. La Porta
et al. (2008, p. 303) cite the observation from Pistor (2006)
that ‘‘all the liberal market economies in the OECD are
common law countries, and all the coordinated ones are
civil law ones’’. They then add ‘‘The literature on the
variety of capitalisms has long looked for an objective
measure of different types; perhaps it should have looked
no further than legal origins’’.
We should emphasise that La Porta et al. do not them-
selves adversely compare the generic ‘‘stakeholder model’’
of capitalism with the ‘‘shareholder model’’; at least they
do not do so explicitly. It is a question on which they
appear to be silent: certainly the term ‘‘stakeholder’’ does
not appear in any of their papers which are cited above.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) do note ‘‘several important
topics closely related to corporate governance that [their]
article does not deal with’’ (p. 740). These are ‘‘the
foundations of contract theory’’, the ‘‘basic elements of
the theory of the firm’’, ‘‘noncapitalist ownership pat-
terns’’ (although they state that ‘‘we pay some attention
to cooperatives’’) and certain functions of ‘‘financial
3 A modified version of the title of the La Porta et al. (1997a) paper,
i.e. ‘‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’’ is the title of the
current article.
4 As pointed out in the La Porta et al. body of work, especially La
Porta et al. (2008), some refinements have been made by the authors
to the variables which they used in the 1997a and 1998 analysis. We
think that it may be helpful if the figures which we quote from La
Porta et al. (1997a) are identifiable from that classic paper. Therefore,
in this article, we have reproduced some of the 1997 data as originally
published; i.e. without adjustment for the subsequent refinements. We
do not believe that updating La Porta et al.’s earlier data would have
any bearing on the evidence and the arguments that we put forward in
the current study.
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intermediaries’’. Given this careful exclusion of ‘‘important
topics’’ related to corporate governance, their silence on
stakeholders in conventionally owned firms is a rather
deafening one.
In their widely cited survey of corporate governance,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) were very clear regarding their
criteria for judging corporate governance:
Our perspective on corporate governance is a straight-
forward agency perspective, sometimes referred to as
separation of ownership and control. We want to know
how investors get managers to give them back their
money. (p. 738)
They go on to make clear that they regard the principal
question in relation to corporate governance systems as
being not whether particular governance systems should be
copied, but rather how external providers of finance can be
provided with legal protection such that large-scale financing
of entities can develop. They emphasise that this is neither
the case in many developing countries, nor in some ‘‘rich
European countries’’ (p. 738). Elsewhere in their paper they
assert that ‘‘The fundamental question of corporate gover-
nance is how to assure financiers that they get a return on
their financial investment.’’ (p. 773, emphasis added)
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) emphasised the absence of a
basis on which to judge corporate governance models. For
example, in relation to the United States, Germany and
Japan, they state that ‘‘all these economies have the
essential elements of a good corporate governance sys-
tem’’, and that ‘‘the available evidence does not tell us
which one of their governance systems is the best’’
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 739, emphasis in original).
The ensuing body of work from La Porta et al. does
however go on to develop a view of which system, based
on levels of investor protection, is best, and that, as indi-
cated above, turns out to be a common-law system (cor-
responding to the Anglo-American version of capitalism).
Berle and Means’ classic analysis, which focuses on the
agency conflict between ownership and control, is cited as
part of a recurring theme in a number of the La Porta et al.
papers (see, especially, La Porta et al. 1999b). That theme is
the need to reappraise a common image of corporate struc-
tures; La Porta et al. state that ‘‘Our results present a different
picture of the ownership structure of a modern corporation
than that suggested by Berle and Means and widely accepted
in the finance literature.’’ (La Porta et al. 1999b, p. 502). In
brief, La Porta et al. (see, especially, La Porta et al. 1999b)
argue that, for many companies, there is a more significant
agency problem than that based on the separation of own-
ership and control. They identify this as the risk to minority
shareholders of expropriation by majority shareholders.
They see this risk as being particularly acute in family con-
trolled companies associated with ‘‘insider’’ economies:
Who keeps the controlling families from expropriat-
ing the minority shareholders, especially in countries
with weak legal protection of these shareholders,
where family control is even more common? Who
monitors the families? (emphasis in original) (La
Porta et al. 1999b, p. 502)
Hence, the degree of legal protection of minority
shareholders is an important criterion in much of their
empirical analysis. To sum up their position we again quote
from La Porta et al. (1999b):
large firms have a problem of separation of ownership
and control, but not the one described by Berle and
Means. … controlling shareholders … have the
power to expropriate the minority shareholders as
well as the interest in so doing. (La Porta et al. 1999b,
p. 511)
However, there is another, more fundamental, insight of
Berle and Means on which La Porta et al. appear to be
silent, and which is an explicit critique of the common law
tradition and its implications for corporate governance.
In their discussion of ‘‘The traditional logic of prop-
erty’’, Berle and Means (1932, Book Four, Chap. 1), refer
to legal, economic and social issues ‘‘which must now be
squarely faced’’. The most important issue that they iden-
tify is ‘‘who should receive the profits of industry’’, in other
words, should large companies be run in the interests of the
‘‘owners’’ or others? Berle and Means place quotation
marks around the word ‘‘owners’’ to indicate the prob-
lematic issue of identifying the meaning of, and the rights
attaching to, ownership of large and publicly important
enterprises. They assert that under common law, the tra-
ditional logic of property requires that the entire profit be
awarded to the shareholders. They discuss the historical
development of the law pertaining to property when power
to manage assets is delegated to others. The dominant
tradition is that those with delegated rights to control assets
owned by others do so as fiduciaries. They follow their
examination of such developments by stating:
Underlying all this is the ancient preoccupation of the
common law with the rights of property. Primarily,
the common law did not undertake to set up ideal
schemes of government. It aimed to protect men in
their own. (Berle and Means 1932, p. 296)
This legal tradition is subjected to a critical reappraisal
by Berle and Means. In this exercise they address funda-
mental questions arising from the separation of ownership
and control. However, their interest in this question was not
confined to the classic agency problem with which they are
closely associated—they were much more concerned with
the significance for wider society of the operation of large
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corporations (Gomez and Korine 2005). Berle and Means
consider that the owners of passive property, having given
up the role of managing their resources, have also given up
the right to have the entity operated in their interest5,6. But
they are also emphatic that the elimination of the ‘‘sole
interest of the passive owner’’ does not mean that the
controlling group should take over the same right: they
conclude that neither ‘‘the claims of ownership nor those of
control can stand against the paramount interests of the
community’’. They recognize that institutional and political
accommodations will need to be fashioned, but hold that:
When a convincing system of community obligations
is worked out and is generally accepted, in that
moment the passive property right of today must
yield before the larger interests of society. (p. 312)
Berle and Means (1932) envisage courts having to
moderate their traditional position on property rights by
whichever ‘‘legal theories they might choose’’ to recognize
what the authors see as a social imperative. We suggest that
their views of the differing characteristics of a legal
framework which aims to balance the interests of all
members of society, and the common law which merely
seeks to defend ‘‘men in their own’’ are of particular sig-
nificance in assessing the work of La Porta et al.
La Porta et al. (1996/1998—hereafter 19987) investi-
gated the legal rules offering protection to shareholders and
creditors in 49 countries. They examined the origin of these
countries’ different legal systems, and the extent to which
shareholders’ and creditors’ rights were enforced. Their
basic classification of legal systems was twofold—those
comprising common law with English origins and those
based on civil law deriving from Roman law. They further
classified the civil tradition countries (drawing on Rey-
nolds and Flores 1989), into the ‘‘three major families’’:
French, German and Scandinavian legal traditions. They
noted that English common law and the French and Ger-
man varieties of civil law had spread to many other
countries through a variety of mechanisms including
colonialism and ‘‘more subtle imitation’’. The number of
countries in each group was, 18 in the English origin group;
21 in the French origin group; six in the German origin
group and four in the Scandinavian group, respectively.
Their investigation of legal regimes showed that common
law countries generally offer stronger legal protection for
investors than their civil law counterparts. Amongst the civil
law groupings the weakest legal protection for investors was
found in the French civil law countries, with the German and
Scandinavian civil law countries in between the French civil
law and common law groups. Another key finding reported
by La Porta et al. (1998) was that weaker investor protection
is associated with more concentrated share ownership.
Consequently, they hypothesized that stronger legal pro-
tection is likely to mean that a larger proportion of shares will
be held in the form of minority holdings by diversified
shareholders.
The latter hypothesis is supported by the findings
reported in La Porta et al. (1997a) which show that coun-
tries with weaker investor protection have ‘‘smaller and
narrower’’ capital markets for both equity and debt. They
highlight the French civil law countries as having ‘‘both the
weakest investor protections and the least developed cap-
ital markets’’ (p. 1131) especially as compared with com-
mon law countries.
La Porta et al. (1997a) acknowledge that they have
refrained from asking ‘‘deeper questions’’ about why dif-
ferences exist between common and civil law countries in
relation to investor protection. (Although La Porta et al.
(2008) does include a searching exploration of the histor-
ical antecedents of the common and civil law traditions.)
They pose the question: ‘‘what is it about the civil law
family, and particularly about the French civil law sub
family, that accounts for the relative unfriendliness of laws
to investors?’’ (p. 1149). Their speculations include the
possibility of pure coincidence, or active legal design
aimed at keeping ‘‘investors relatively weak, and to assure
family firms and the state a larger role in economic
development?’’. They also speculate about whether ‘‘poor
laws are just a proxy for an environment that is hostile to
institutional development’’ and, drawing on evidence in La
Porta et al. (1997b), suggest that countries which have low
levels of trust among their citizens have less effective
5 Macintosh (1999, p. 139) examines the celebrated exchange
between Adolf A. Berle Jr and E. Merrick Dodd Jr in the early
1930s, in which Berle argued ‘‘that the management of a corporation
could only be held accountable to shareholders… whereas Dodd held
that corporations were accountable to both the society in which they
operated and their shareholders’’. Clearly, Berle’s position within this
debate does not fit squarely with the conclusions outlined by Berle
and Means (1932), which demand that modern corporations serve all
of society. However, both Macintosh (1999, p. 146) and Ireland
(2001, p. 150) point out that Berle’s position within this debate
changed and that he began to acknowledge the ‘‘validity of Dodd’s
views’’. While Macintosh (1999) suggests the change in Berle’s
perspective became evident in the 1950s, Ireland (2001) suggests that,
‘‘by the time of the publication of The Modern Corporation and
Private Property in late 1932 Berle’s own position had begun to
shift.’’
6 In the General Theory, Keynes (1936) famously went somewhat
further than Berle and Means in his disdain for rewarding the passive
investor. He advocated (metaphorically) ‘‘the euthanasia of the
rentier, of the functionless investor’’ (p. 235) and the consequent
‘‘euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to
exploit the scarcity value of capital’’.
7 La Porta et al. (1998) is the later (published) version of a working
paper which appeared in 1996. The 1996 version is referred to in the
1997a paper, the latter being to an extent a development of it. The
sequence of the La Porta et al. work may not be apparent unless this is
made clear. As indicated in the text our main focus in the current
paper is La Porta et al. (1997a).
Legal Determinants of External Finance Revisited 397
123
institutions. In particular they wonder whether ‘‘some
broad underlying factor, related to trust’’ may influence all
institutions in a country including legal systems and capital
markets.8
In La Porta et al. (1998), the authors also seek to place
their findings in a wider context and pose ‘‘the ultimate
question’’ of ‘‘whether countries with poor investor pro-
tections … actually do suffer’’ (p. 1152). This question is
partially answered by reference to work cited by King and
Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) which found
that ‘‘developed debt and equity markets contribute to
economic growth’’. La Porta et al. (1998) also highlighted
evidence from Levine (1998) who confirmed the King and
Levine as well as the Levine and Zervos findings when the
analysis was extended to incorporate a La Porta et al.
‘‘legal origin variable’’. La Porta et al. also cited Rajan and
Zingales (1995) who found that growth in capital intensive
industries was related to the level of development of
financial systems. Thus, La Porta et al. (1998) identified a
link from the legal system of a country to its level of
economic development, while acknowledging that the
obstacles to growth created by poor investor protection had
not prevented certain countries (they mention, in particular,
France and Belgium) from becoming rich. The evidence
regarding the link between legal tradition and economic
growth has been reassessed by La Porta et al. (2008) but,
ten years later, their perspective on the significance of legal
regimes was summed up as follows:
In sum, there is by now a great deal of evidence that
legal origins influence legal rules and regulations,
which in turn have substantial impact on important
economic outcomes—from financial development, to
unemployment, to investment and entry, to the size of
unofficial economy, to international trade. Much of this
evidence suggests that common law is associated with
better economic outcomes than French civil law. The
evidence also shows that legal origins influence pat-
terns of growth within industries, but it is less clear that
legal origins predict aggregate growth. The last finding
resonates with the obvious observation made by LLSV
[La Porta et al.] (1998) that countries like France and
Belgium achieved high living standards despite their
legal origin. (La Porta et al. 2008, p. 302)
In this article, we take issue with the criterion, namely
economic growth, used by La Porta et al., at least in their
earlier work, to address the ‘‘ultimate question’’ of whether
countries with poor investor protection ‘‘do suffer’’. The
fact that subsequent evidence on that specific issue is
unclear is beside the point. We take a broader social per-
spective in which economic growth is regarded as a means
to an end, not an end in itself. Answering our ‘‘ultimate
question’’ relies on the criterion of societal well-being
rather than the ‘‘better economic outcomes’’ referred to by
La Porta et al. Of course there may not be a clear consensus
on how societal well-being should be measured, although
the same argument could be advanced about economic
growth. There are, however, increasingly widely reported
and authoritative social indicators which do inform such
judgments (see, for example, the United Nations’ annual
Human Development Reports and UNICEF’s annual State
of the World’s Children Reports 2004). In the next section,
we shall briefly discuss the development and use of social
indicators and argue that they reveal a very different per-
spective on the relative performance of common and civil
law countries from that put forward by La Porta et al.
Social Indicators and an Extension of the La Porta et al.
(1997a) Analysis
In the 1960s and early 1970s, a ‘social indicators movement’
arose as a result of the perceived inadequacy of the informa-
tion available to policy makers (Carley 1981; see also Glatzer
1981) to promote human welfare under circumstances of
significant economic growth. In Bauer (2006, cited in Glatzer
1981) the concept of social indicators was ‘‘elaborated for the
first time’’ (Glatzer 1981) although Glatzer also points out that
the same fundamental concepts had also received attention
from the United Nations in the 1950s. The suitability of
macroeconomic metrics as indicators of societal welfare was
increasingly questioned based on a growing body of research
(see, for example, Christian 1974; Galnoor 1974; Goeke 1974;
Liu 1974; Seashore 1974). The field of enquiry into social
indicators burgeoned and the early 1970s saw the inception of
the specialist journal, Social Indicators Research. Indeed,
only a few years later, Glatzer (1981) stated that its ‘‘breadth
and diversity’’ meant that ‘‘no one social scientist can hope to
provide an adequate survey of the relevant literature.’’ By
1976, the OECD had reported that:
growth is not an end in itself, but rather an instrument
for creating better conditions of life [and] increased
attention must be given to the qualitative aspects of
growth, and to the formulation of policies with
respect to the broad economic and social choices
involved in the allocation of growing resources.
(OECD 1976, p. 7)
Arguably the interest in social indicators, certainly as
regards the developed economies, reached a high water
mark in the 1970s, mirroring, to some extent, progressive
8 In his examination of happiness, Layard (2005), drawing on Putnam
(2000) reported that in continental Europe ‘‘levels of trust have
improved (or not fallen) in every country since 1980’’ whereas, over a
broadly comparable period, levels of trust had steadily declined in UK
and US.
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developments in the field of corporate accountability at that
time (see for example, ASSC 1975; Burchell et al. 1985;
Gray et al. 1995). Soon afterwards, there were fundamental
changes in the political climate (see, for example, Day and
Woodward 2004; Woodward et al. 2001) and since then, at
least within the ‘‘common law’’ countries, economic metrics
have been ‘‘regnant’’ (Diener and Suh 1997) as reflected, we
would argue, in the criteria used by La Porta et al. In the
current article we report on a subset of the indicators pub-
lished annually by the United Nations and, like La Porta
et al., we consider the entity of interest to be the nation state.
La Porta’s 1997 Analysis Revisited with Social
Indicators
In this article, we have followed a similar pattern for the
presentation of data to that used in La Porta et al. (1997a). In
Table II of that paper (p. 1138), they listed 49 countries,
grouped by legal origin, and reported empirical measures of
financial and legal variables with means calculated for each
legal origin. Our equivalent to Table II in La Porta et al.
(1997a) is Table 2; it differs from the La Porta et al. Table II
in three ways. First, we have added a number of social
indicator variables. The social indicators comprise: the under
5 child mortality rate (U5MR 01-04); two separate measures
of income inequality (R10/P10—based on the richest and
poorest deciles, and the Gini index—based on income dis-
tribution across the whole population); the log of the prison
population (Log Pr Pop) and the proportion of women in the
lower, or a single, house of legislators (% Women MPs).
These variables are defined in more detail in Table 1a.
Second, we have restricted the number of countries
investigated. The 49 countries considered by La Porta et al.
span a very wide range of social and economic develop-
ment. Had we used the same list of countries, any associ-
ations that may exist between social indicators and legal
origins may well have been masked by the very large
differences attributable to other factors. Such masking
would be especially relevant to health indicators which
show gross discrepancies between rich and poor countries
lying on opposite sides of the ‘‘epidemiological transi-
tion’’.9,10 Our choice of countries is, therefore, a subset
of the 49 investigated by La Porta et al. and is based on the
method adopted by Collison et al. (2007) which investi-
gated child mortality in wealthy nations. In order to com-
pare rich countries on the same side of the epidemiological
divide, Collison et al. (2007) restricted their examination to
the 24 wealthiest OECD countries. Of those 24, only 22 are
included in the current analysis since two, Iceland and
Luxembourg, were not included in the La Porta et al. study.
The restriction in the number of countries has not altered
the relative outcomes originally recorded by La Porta et al.
Their aggregated ranking of countries, when grouped by
legal origin, persists when their data is restated for the
smaller group of developed OECD countries. Both sets of
aggregated figures, for the larger and smaller groups, are
shown in bold in Table 2.
Third, we have reported in Table 2 only a subset of the
indicators from La Porta et al. (1997a). The indicators
reported are those from the first four columns of Table II in
La Porta et al., and they measure various proxies for
shareholder protection and the vitality of equity markets.
This has been done to aid clarity of the exposition. The
definitions of these variables are reproduced, in summary
form, in Table 1b. The rest of the financial/legal variables
considered by La Porta et al. (1997a) are reproduced in an
Annex to this article (in ‘‘Supplement to Table 1b’’ and
‘‘Supplement to Table 2’’) and they are also included in
statistical investigations which appear later in the article.
The basis of the choice of the social indicators listed in
Table 1a, merits some explanation. Results reported in
Collison et al. (2007, 2010) highlighting the poor perfor-
mance of the Anglo-American countries suggested the
possibility of an underlying systemic relationship involving
poor societal well-being which could be linked to income
inequality. The epidemiological literature provides addi-
tional evidence to support such a proposition (see, for
example, Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Two measures of
income inequality were chosen and are explained in more
detail in Table 1. They are the widely used Gini coefficient
which takes into account income levels across an entire
population, and a second, more extreme, measure which is
a ratio based only on the income received by the top and
bottom population deciles. The child mortality and prison
population variables were chosen as examples of indicators
which previous research had shown to be related to income
inequality (see, for example, Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).
The percentage of women MPs was selected since it
seemed to be a potential discriminator between common
and civil law traditions; the former being identified with the
9 The epidemiological transition is a significant stage in the
relationship between health and economic development; it occurs
where increased prosperity allows the eradication of many infectious
diseases and other readily preventable causes of illness and death. As
Kohn (2001, p. 40) states: ‘‘Above this transition point, absolute
wealth makes little difference to life expectancy’’.
10 Two previous studies have addressed, to a limited extent, links
between the work of La Porta et al., on legal origins, and certain
social indicators (La Porta et al. 1999a; Ahlering and Deakin 2007,
pp. 890–891). In both cases, no account was taken of the potentially
confounding effects of the fundamentally different relationships
between per capita wealth and social indicators on either side of the
Footnote 10 continued
‘‘epidemiological transition’’, In particular the widely reported rela-
tionship, for wealthier countries, between income inequality and a
range of social indicators was not examined in these studies.
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preservation of established interests. It seemed plausible
that such values could be manifested in various ways:
If the mechanics of a particular electoral system
exclude to a large degree members of a particular
ascriptive group (women or otherwise), then more
often than not that is damning evidence that the
system is excluding the interests of that particular
group from the structures of decision-making pow-
er….Indeed, the degree to which a system success-
fully includes women can indicate a propensity for
the system to include other disenfranchised minori-
ties. (Reynolds 1999, p. 549)
The statistical significance of the relationships between
social indicators and legal origin and between social indi-
cators and some of the specific measures related to investor
protection used by La Porta et al. are examined in some detail
below. But a number of striking patterns emerge from a
visual inspection of the mean statistics for the social indi-
cators chosen. Consistent with the results from Collison et al.
(2007, 2010), the common law (i.e. English origin) countries
have the worst child mortality figures and the highest levels
of income inequality. The common law countries also have
the largest mean prison population in the OECD and this
result too is consistent with findings reported by Wilkinson
and Pickett (2009) that ‘‘more unequal countries have higher
rates of imprisonment than more equal countries’’ (p. 148).
The association of income inequality with a range of
social ills which is now widely established in the
epidemiological literature is reflected in the consistent
ranking of the legal origin groups across the income
inequality, child mortality and prison population indicators.
In each case, the Scandinavian countries perform best,
followed by the German group. The French group is con-
sistently ranked third while the common law countries are
consistently ranked at the bottom.11
Table 1 Description of the social indicators (a) and summarised description of the variables reported in Table 1 of La Porta et al. (1997a) (b)
(a)
U5MR 01-04 Mean under 5 child mortality rate for the years 2001–2004. Source UNICEF’s State
of the World’s Children Reports 2003–2006.
R10/P10 The ratio of the income or expenditure share of the richest 10% of a population to that
of the poorest 10%. Source UN Human Development Report (HDR) 2007–2008.
Gini index Gini coefficient of income inequality. Source UN HDR 2007–2008. This measure,
unlike the R10/P10 ratio, is based on income levels for an entire population.
Log Pr Pop Log of prison population as at January 2007. Source HDR 2007–2008.
% Women MPs Percentage of Women in lower or single house of legislators as at 31 May 2007. Source HDR 2007–2008.
(b)
Ext cap/GNP The ratio of the stock market capitalisation held by minorities to gross national product in 1994.
Domestic firms/pop Ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population
(in millions) in 1994. Source: emerging market fact book and world development report 1996.
IPOs/pop Ratio of the number of initial public offerings of equity in a given country to its population
(in millions) for the period July 1995 to June 1996.
AntiDir Rights An index aggregating shareholder rights.
Note that the data reported in this table are not all from the same year as each other or as the data reported in the La Porta et al. (1997a) study.
The figures on child mortality have been taken from the Collison et al. (2007) paper for consistency with that set of data. (It should be noted that
more recent child mortality figures based on the years 2005–2007 have also been confirmed as showing comparable statistically significant
correlations with income inequality (Collison et al. 2010)). The differences in base year relative to the La Porta et al. (1997a) study are arguably
appropriate in principle, since one could regard social indicators as being a lagging variable relative to economic indicators, though the ideal time
differences for an examination such as this are moot. Furthermore, we would not expect the figures and relationships under consideration to be
very sensitive to such timing issues
11 Although not addressing social indicators per se, Chih et al. (2010)
consider the ‘‘determinants’’ of Corporate Social Responsibility, and
utilise La Porta et al.’s (1998) ‘‘Shareholder Rights and Legal
Enforcement’’ indices in their analysis. They find that, ‘‘interestingly
and rather strikingly, those firms in countries with stronger investor
rights engage in less CSR activities’’ (p. 132). They suggest that,
‘‘stronger shareholder rights are found to have the negative impact on
the incentives of firms to engage in CSR activities, since financial
firms in countries with stronger shareholder rights may tend to be
geared toward shareholders’ welfare at the expense of fulfilling their
obligations to other stakeholders’’ (p. 132). However, drawing on La
Porta et al. (1999a, b), Jackson and Apostolakou (2010, p. 388), report
that firms engage in greater levels of CSR where shareholder
protection is stronger. They state, ‘‘Firms appear to adopt CSR to
compensate for strong shareholder rights by embedding these within
broader social commitments… findings suggest that the adoption of
CSR practices, particularly on the social dimension, emerges as a
substitute for formal participation of employees only in parallel to the
expansion of legal rights for shareholders or growing orientation of
shareholder value by corporate management’’ (p. 388). Of course,
comparisons of CSR activities are hampered by definitional and
measurement problems due to differing visibilities and institutional
contexts (see for example, the consideration of implicit and explicit
CSR by Matten and Moon (2008)). Furthermore, as alluded to by
Jackson and Apostolakou, CSR may be associated with instrumental
motives in liberal market economies.
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The final social indicator, percentage of women MPs,
is of a different type to the others but, as discussed
above may be considered as a proxy for the progression
of the democratic impulse and so could be construed as
having features in common with the other measures.
This indicator again shows, we would argue, the worst
performance being found amongst the common law
countries (in aggregate); although admittedly, there
appears to be little difference between the three non-
Scandinavian groups. Close inspection reveals that the
results are influenced by a few outliers. In the German
group, the Asian nations have low figures which may be
accounted for by differing cultural traditions. Were these
to be removed, a rather different gradation of means
would be apparent. However, the figures for France,
Greece and Ireland are all also relatively low. A cultural/
historical examination of possible explanations for these
figures goes beyond the scope of this article. But we
would venture that, prima facie, this evidence, taken
together with that pertaining to income inequality, is
consistent with the position advanced above by Reynolds
regarding the distribution of power and influence in
society.
The next part of this section presents a more rigorous
statistical examination of the data in Table 2 (and the rest
of the La Porta et al. data which appears in the Annex to
this article) but it already appears that, compared to the
civil law countries, the common-law tradition is associated
with greater inequality and, possibly, with a relatively
conservative approach to social development.



















Australia 0.49 63.55 – 4 6 12.5 35.2 2.10 24.7
Canada 0.39 40.86 4.93 4 6.5 9.4 32.6 2.03 20.8
Ireland 0.27 20 0.75 3 6 9.4 34.3 1.86 13.3
New Zealand 0.28 69 0.66 4 6 12.5 36.2 2.27 32.2
UK 0.49 35.68 2.01 4 6.5 13.8 36.0 2.09 19.7
USA 0.39 30.11 3.11 5 8 15.9 40.8 2.87 16.3
English origin avg 0.50 43.2 2.29 4 6.5 12.3 35.9 2.20 21.2
La Porta et al. avga 0.60 35.45 2.23 3.39
Belgium 0.17 15.5 0.3 0 5.5 8.2 33.0 1.96 34.7
France 0.23 8.05 0.17 2 5.5 9.1 32.7 1.93 12.2
Greece 0.07 21.6 0.3 1 5 10.2 34.3 1.95 13
Italy 0.08 3.91 0.31 0 5.25 11.6 36.0 2.02 17.3
Netherlands 0.52 21.13 0.66 2 5.5 9.2 30.9 2.11 36.7
Portugal 0.08 19.5 0.5 2 5.5 15.0 38.5 2.08 21.3
Spain 0.17 9.71 0.07 2 5.25 10.3 34.7 2.16 36
French origin avg 0.19 14.2 0.33 1.29 5.36 10.5 34.3 2.03 24.5
La Porta et al. avga 0.21 10.00 0.19 1.76
Austria 0.06 13.87 0.25 2 5 6.9 29.1 2.02 32.2
Germany 0.13 5.14 0.08 1 5 6.9 28.3 1.98 31.6
Japan 0.62 17.78 0.26 3 4.5 4.5 24.9 1.79 9.4
Korea, Rep of 0.44 15.88 0.02 2 5.25 7.8 31.6 1.99 13.4
Switzerland 0.62 33.85 – 1 5.5 9.0 33.7 1.92 25
German origin avg 0.37 17.3 0.15 1.8 5.05 7.0 29.5 1.94 22.3
La Porta et al. avga 0.46 16.79 0.12 2.00
Denmark 0.21 50.4 1.8 3 4.25 8.1 24.7 1.89 36.9
Finland 0.25 13 0.6 2 4.75 5.6 26.9 1.88 42
Norway 0.22 33 4.5 3 4 6.1 25.8 1.82 37.9
Sweden 0.51 12.66 1.66 2 3.25 6.2 25.0 1.91 47.3
Scandinavian avg 0.30 27.26 2.14 2.5 4.06 6.5 25.6 1.87 41.0
La Porta et al. avga 0.30 27.26 2.14 2.5
Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 1
a Means reported for the original, and larger groups of countries reported in La Porta et al. (1997a)
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Statistical Analysis
The empirical analysis in this section of the article has a
number of parts. Initially, the social indicator variables (the
under 5 child mortality rate, the two measures of income
inequality—R10/P10 and the Gini index, the log of the
prison population and % women MPs) are examined for
each of the legal-tradition categories which La Porta et al.
derive. Specifically, the mean (median) of each of the
social indicators is calculated for all four legal tradition
groupings of countries and a test of the null hypothesis that
the means (medians) were equal is conducted. The second
empirical component of the current article examines the
relationships that exist between the various proxies for
investor protection which La Porta et al. employ when
grouping countries and the social indicators examined in
the current investigation. In particular, correlation analysis
is used to study the sign and size of any relationships that
may be present. The third empirical part of the analysis
distils the information in the ten investor protection proxy
variables, used by La Porta et al., into a number of prin-
cipal components and regresses these components on the
social indicators for the developed countries considered in
the current study. In this way, a comprehensive investiga-
tion is undertaken to determine whether certain investor
protection proxy variables and some legal tradition
groupings of countries are associated with better indicators
of social health and development such as under 5 child
mortality, measures of income inequality, the size of the
prison population or the representation of women among
elected members of a country’s parliament.
The initial investigation focused on whether the five
social indicator variables being considered varied across
the four groupings of countries from La Porta et al. based
on legal traditions. The results from this analysis are shown
in Table 3. The top half of this table reports the findings
from an analysis of means while the bottom half documents
the results for an investigation of the median values for
each of the social indicator variables; the median analysis
is reported because some of the descriptive statistics in
Table 2 suggested that the variables might not be normally
distributed. In the top half of the table, the mean value of
each social indicator together with its standard deviation is
provided for all four legal traditions. An F statistic and its
p value are then reported for a test of the null hypothesis
that these means were equal. In the bottom half of the
article, median values and their associated Z statistics are
provided for each of the four groupings of countries and an
H statistic together with its p value are shown for the null
hypothesis that these median values were equal.
An analysis of Table 3 reveals that sizeable differences
exist in the measures of social health across the four
groupings of countries based on La Porta et al.’s
classification scheme. In particular, the mean level of under
5 child mortality in countries where the legal tradition has
an English common law origin (mean = 6.500) is 60%
higher than in Scandinavian countries (mean = 4.063). A
similar picture emerges from the other four social indicator
variables considered. Specifically, countries where the
legal system is based on an English common law tend to
have the greatest income inequality (according to both the
R10/P10 and Gini index variables), the highest average
prison populations and smallest percentage of women MPs.
The Scandinavian countries perform best. In between, the
countries where the legal tradition is based on French Law
have the second highest (i.e. second worst) indicators
across the first four variables, while those where the legal
origin is German in character are ranked third.12 In some of
the subsequent analysis, the four legal origins are labelled
Legal Origin (LO) 1–4 according to their order in Table 3
and, for the purposes of the correlation analysis in Table 4,
they are ranked in this order as the Legal Origin variable.
A more detailed inspection of Table 3 reveals that there
is some variability within the country groupings for the
social indicator variables being studied. In particular, some
of the standard deviation figures were large. This seems to
be especially the case for English common law countries
where the standard deviation values were highest for three
of the five social indicator variables being examined. For
example, the standard deviation value of the log of prison
population variable for English common law countries of
0.352 is nearly four times as large as the next highest
standard deviation number. By contrast, Scandinavian
countries tend to be much more homogenous in terms of
the social indicator variables since the standard deviation
values are smallest for four of the five measures being
examined.
Despite this variability within groupings, the picture that
emerges from Table 3 is that a very consistent pattern
exists in terms of the rankings of the country groupings
according to their social indicator variables. The F statis-
tics confirm that the mean values for each social indicator
are not equal across the four country groupings. All of the
F statistics were large and statistically significant at the
10% levels; indeed, four of the p values are less than the
critical value of 0.05. This finding is confirmed by an
analysis of the median values and their corresponding
12 It should be noted that the ranking for the final social indicator
variable (% Women MPs) is the opposite to that for the other four
where a high number is better than a low number; for the other four
variables, a larger number indicates a higher level of child mortality, a
greater level of income inequality and a greater prison population. In
addition, this final indicator is the only one in which there is an
exception to the otherwise consistent ranking order. This is the case
for the French and German figures for % Women MPs when ranked
by mean, but the common pattern is completely consistent when the
rankings are done by median, as shown in the lower panel of Table 3.
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H statistics. With the exception of ‘‘% Women MPs’’, the
rankings of country groupings based on median values are
identical to those based on their mean counterparts. Fur-
ther, the null hypothesis that the medians are equal across
the four country groupings can be rejected for four of the
five social indicator variables; the exception to this general
finding related to the log of prison population where the
H statistic is only 9.32 and its p value is 0.25.
The Spearman correlations13 (a) among the investor
protection and legal origin variables and (b) between the
investor protection as well as legal origin variables and the
social indicator measures are displayed in Table 4. Based
on the results from Table 2, and the ranking of the Legal
Origin variable based on Table 3, one would of course
expect the correlation findings to confirm that a relation-
ship exists between the legal origin of a country and its
social indicators. However, this table goes further by
examining whether a relationship exists between (i) the
investor protection measures on which the legal origin
grouping is based and (ii) the social indicator variables.
Further, the table highlights whether there are correlations
among the different investor protection measures which La
Porta et al. employ or whether each one is capturing a
different aspect of the legal origin grouping used by La
Porta et al.
A visual inspection of Table 4 reveals that there is a
strong negative association between: under 5 child mor-
tality; income inequality; as well as the size of prison
population; and the legal origin measure used: of course
these associations are to be expected given the construction
of the legal origin variable. In addition, the association
between the % of women MPs and legal origin is positive,
consistent with the figures showing that Scandinavian
countries have a much larger representation of female
elected representatives in their Parliament relative to their
common law counterparts. When the investor protection
variables were examined, however, relatively few of the
correlations were statistically significant; in fact only six
correlation values have p values of less than 0.05: Anti Dir
and U5MR 01-04, FirmsPop and U5MR 01-04, GDP
Growth and % Women MPs, Log GNP and % Women
MPs, 1s1vote and % Women MPs, Rule of Law and %
Women MPs. The remaining 44 correlations in the bottom
panel of Table 4 are not statistically different from zero at
the 5% level.
In the top half of Table 4, there is some evidence that
the investor protection variables are correlated with one
another. Of the 45 correlation values calculated, 12 were
statistically significant: ExCapGNP and AntiDir, ExCa-
pGNP and FirmsPop, ExCapGNP and IPOsPop, ExCa-
pGNP and Debt/GNP, AntiDir and FirmsPop, AntiDir and
IPOsPop, FirmsPop and IPOsPop, 1s1vote and IPOsPop,
Debt/GNP and Log GNP, GDP Growth and 1s1vote, GDP
Growth and Rule of Law, 1s1vote and Rule of Law. Such a
Table 3 An analysis of the social indicator variables according to a country’s legal origin
Legal origin U5MR 01-04 R10/P10 Gini index Log Pr Pop % Women MPs
Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev
English 6.500 0.775 12.250 2.534 35.850 2.758 2.203 0.352 21.167 6.664
French 5.357 0.197 10.514 2.256 34.300 2.466 2.030 0.089 24.457 11.036
German 5.050 0.371 7.020 1.651 29.520 3.347 1.939 0.090 22.320 10.457
Scandinavian 4.063 0.625 6.500 1.098 25.600 0.983 1.874 0.040 41.025 4.730
F statistic 18.18 9.28 15.73 2.72 4.64
p value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01
Legal origin U5MR 01-04 R10/P10 Gini index Log Pr Pop % Women MPs
Median Z statistic Median Z statistic Median Z statistic Median Z statistic Median Z statistic
English 6.250 3.540 12.500 2.730 35.600 2.430 2.097 1.990 20.250 -1.220
French 5.500 0.180 10.200 1.450 34.300 1.450 2.017 1.020 21.300 -0.530
German 5.000 -1.210 6.900 -2.230 29.100 -1.610 1.978 -0.980 25.000 -0.940
Scandinavian 4.125 -2.980 6.150 -2.470 25.400 -2.810 1.881 -2.470 39.950 3.060
H statistic 17.86 15.70 14.19 9.32 9.64
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.02
13 The non-parametric Spearman rank correlation analysis was
selected because there was some evidence that the variables being
examined were not normally distributed. In fact, descriptive statistics
revealed that data for one of the social indicators and six of the
investor protection variables were positively skewed. In addition,
there was some evidence of kurtosis in the data series. However, an
analysis of the parametric Pearson correlation coefficients revealed
very little difference in the values calculated.
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result is hardly surprising since many of the variables were
constructed from a common component (e.g. GNP) while
all were presumably selected by La Porta et al. because
they helped to paint a picture about one issue (namely the
protection of investor rights) within a country. All of these
significant correlations had the expected signs. For exam-
ple, it is not surprising that the correlation between Ex-
CapGNP and Anti Dir is positive at 0.522 since one would
expect the index value aggregating shareholders rights in a
country to be high where the ratio of the capitalisation held
by minority shareholders to GNP is high.
Since there is some evidence of a relationship among the
investor protection variables from La Porta et al. studies, it
was decided to use a statistical approach to take account of
this correlation before examining the association between
social indicators and the investor protection variables using
regression analysis.14
To examine the possible relationship between indicators
of social performance and the various investor protection
variables in the La Porta et al. studies, Principal Compo-
nents Analysis (PCA) was employed to identify relevant
factors from the pool of data under consideration. PCA is a
method which significantly reduces the number of vari-
ables from p to a much smaller set of k derived orthogonal
variables that retain most of the information in the original
p variables. The k derived variables which maximise the
variance accounted for in the original variables are called
principal components (PCs). After applying this analysis to
the data series of each of the developed countries being
studied, the dominant PCs are then extracted and used as
inputs into a regression analysis to seek to explain the
social indicators included in the study. The use of PCA is
appealing for a number of reasons. First, it allows a large
number of theoretically important factors that may affect
the social indicators to be considered and second, it can be
used effectively in conjunction with multiple regression
analysis by addressing the problems of multicollinearity;
specifically, because the k derived variables are orthogonal
to each other, multicollinearity should not be present.
Table 5 summarises the results from applying PCA to
the investor protection variables considered in the La Porta
et al. papers. In particular, the bottom part of Table 5
details the eigenvalues and proportions of variance
explained by the PCs, while the top part of Table 5 sum-
marises the factor loadings for the dominant PCs. The data
in Table 5 clearly show that across all 22 countries
examined, the bulk of the variability in the original ten
investor protection variables can be explained by 4 PCs.





















AntiDir -0.423* 0.522* 1.000
Firms/Pop -0.364* 0.425* 0.671* 1.000
IPOs/Pop -0.222 0.413* 0.656* 0.688* 1.000
CredR 0.238 -0.030 0.016 0.004 -0.126 1.000
Debt/GNP -0.168 0.481* 0.311 -0.032 -0.186 0.226 1.000
GDP growth -0.148 -0.129 0.162 -0.164 -0.214 -0.139 -0.011 1.000
Log GNP -0.125 0.336 0.040 -0.307 0.181 0.050 0.557* 0.186 1.000
1s1vote 0.162 0.063 -0.119 -0.031 -0.413* 0.066 -0.023 0.313 0.073 1.000
Rule of law 0.096 0.260 0.208 0.273 0.441* -0.096 0.216 -0.382* -0.056 -0.503* 1.000
U5MR 01-04 -0.912* 0.349 0.418* 0..416* 0.219 -0.266 0.248 0.056 0.179 -0.285 0.065
R10/P10 -0.838* 0.036 0.293 0.350 0.206 -0.204 -0.003 0.009 0.035 -0.240 -0.207
Gini index -0.801* -0.007 0.146 0.199 -0.029 -0.243 0.037 0.044 0.006 -0.188 -0.200
Log Pr Pop -0.649* 0.049 0.248 0.199 0.019 0.130 0.336 -0.027 0.214 -0.261 0.088
% Women MPs 0.484* -0.112 -0.093 0.012 0.285 0.300 -0.172 -0.417* -0.368* -0.533* 0.553*
Note: This table shows the Spearman correlation coefficients for the variables included in the analysis. The top half of the table displays the
correlation coefficients among the investor protection and legal origin variables while the bottom half of the table shows the correlation between
the social indicators and the La Porta et al. variables. The Legal Origin variable reflects the ordinal ranking in Table 3. An explanation of the
other variables is provided in Table 1 and in Supplement to Table 1b in Annex 1
* Indicates significance at the 1% level for a one-tail test
14 In fact, a regression of the social indicator variables on all of the
investor protection measures and the legal origin dummy variables
indicated that multicollinearity was present in the data. For example,
when U5MR 01-04 was the dependent variable, five of the
independent variables had variance inflation factors (VIFs) that were
greater than 10. Thus, PCA was employed to overcome this problem.
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For example, the variance, or eigenvalue, of the first PC is
3.027. It explains 30.3% of the total variance of the ten
investor protection variables. The second PC has an
eigenvalue of 2.291 and accounts for 22.9% of total vari-
ance of the 10 variables. The third and fourth PCs also have
eigenvalues greater than 1 and account for 17.0 and 11.3%,
respectively, of the variability in the investor protection
measures across the different countries. The proportion of
variance explained by the remaining six PCs is relatively
low and their eigenvalues are all small.
The Kaiser criterion was used to select the PCs which
should be used as inputs for the regression analysis. The
criterion recommends that only those PCs with eigenvalues
greater than or equal to 1, should be retained (Kaiser 1960).
Jolliffe (1972) has suggested a cut-off point of 0.7. How-
ever, in this instance, Jolliffe’s criterion results in the same
number of components being retained as Kaiser’s criterion
of the eigenvalue being greater than or equal to 1 (Dunt-
eman 1994). Therefore, the adoption of these criteria led to
the retention of four PCs, which we describe in more detail
below. Together, these four PCs account for 81.5% of the
variance in the investor protection variables. Therefore, the
dimensionality of the dataset can be reduced from 10 to 4.
The values in the top half of Table 5 indicate the factor
loadings of the PCs that are identified from the data. In
particular, the top half of the table therefore highlights the
variables that have large coefficients of either sign in each
PC vector.15 The first PC, which is shown in column 2, has
high positive correlations with AntiDir, Rule of Law and
IPOsPop and negative correlations with GDP Growth as
well as 1s1vote. This PC primarily reflects strong share-
holder rights and a vibrant new issue market; we have
labelled it ‘‘Outsider Capitalism’’ in the current analysis.
The second PC shows large negative co-efficients for Ex-
CapGNP, GDP Growth and 1s1vote and can be interpreted
as small stock market/low growth variable. We label this
PC ‘‘Insider Capitalism’’ in the remainder of the article.
The largest co-efficients for the third PC are positive for
FirmsPop and negative for GDP Growth as well as Debt/
GNP. This can be interpreted as a large stock market/low
growth/low debt variable; as a result, we label this PC as
the ‘‘Small Economy’’ variable. The fourth PC is mainly
associated with strong ‘‘Creditor Rights’’.
In the final part of the empirical analysis, the dominant
PCs together with legal origin dummy variables are used as
inputs to a regression analysis in order to explain the social
indicator variables of the 22 developed countries included
in this study.16 Five regression models are considered.
First, the under 5 child mortality figures of the sample
countries are regressed on each of the four PCs as well as
three dummy variables representing legal origin (LO2
(French), LO3 (German) and LO4 (Scandinavian)); a var-
iable was not added for LO1 (English) as the regression
equation would have been over-specified. Instead, the
impact of Legal Origin 1 is accounted for in the constant
term: all of the other co-efficients need to be interpreted
relative to the level of under 5 child mortality rate (U5MR
01-04) in English common law countries.17 Four similar
regression equations were estimated for the other social
indicator variables. These regression models took the form:
SIsi ¼ b0 þ b1PC1i þ b2PC2i þ b3PC3i þ b4PC4i
þ b5LO2 þ b6LO3 þ b7LO4 þ ei ð1Þ
where SIsi is the social indicator s for country i
(s = U5MR 01-04, R10/P10, Gini index, Log Pr Pop and
% Women MPs), PCi is principal component for country i,
LO is the Legal Origin dummy variable for French (LO2),
German (LO3) and Scandinavian (LO4) legal traditions.
Finally, ei is a random error term.
Table 6 reports the results from estimating Eq. 1.18 In
particular, the table details the co-efficient of each PC and
Legal Origin dummy variable, with their corresponding
p values. The adjusted R2s for the five regressions are also
shown. An inspection of Table 6 suggests that a significant
relationship exists between some of the social indicator
measures and the PC as well as a number of the legal origin
dummy variables. The strongest and most significant
associations are between under 5 child mortality as well as
15 PCA is subject to a number of limitations. One limitation of the
method is that it can often be difficult to interpret the principal
components. This situation typically arises when several variables in
the PC vectors have large coefficients of either sign (Dunteman 1994).
However, this limitation was not a concern in the current analysis as,
for each variable, the identity of the high loading variables in each PC
vector was very clear. A second limitation of the technique is that the
choice of how many PCs to extract for further analysis is subjective;
although the PCs will explain most of the variation in the original
factors, they may not be useful in explaining the dependent variable
(Brooks 2002). That is, and in terms of the current analysis, although
the PCs will explain most of the variation in the original investor
protection factors, they may not be the most useful at explaining the
relationships between investor protection and social indicator
variables.
16 In fact, the regression results reported in this paper relate to data
for 20 of the 22 countries since IPOsPop information was missing for
Australia and Switzerland. However, imputing values for these two
missing observations and thereby increasing the sample up to 22
countries does not alter either the PCA results or the regression
findings.
17 A regression was also run where one dummy variable was added
depending on whether the country had an English common law
tradition (value = 1), or not (value = 0). In this instance, the dummy
variable had the following co-efficients: 2.237 (p = 0.000) for
under 5 child mortality; 5.124 (p = 0.038) for R10/P10; 10.498
(p = 0.003) for the Gini index; 0.256 (p = 0.142) for Log Pr Pop;
and -16.143 (p = 0.013) for % Women MPs.
18 Although not shown in Table 6, the VIFs for all of the variables
were less than 5.0 suggesting that multicollinearity was not a problem
in these regression equations.
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income inequality and legal origin variables. For example,
the co-efficients for the legal origin variables are negative
for the U5MR 01-04 equation suggesting that under 5 child
mortality is lower in countries which do not have an
English common law tradition; for those countries with a
German or Scandinavian legal tradition, the co-efficients
on the U5MR 01-04 variable are statistically significant at
the 5% level. A similar picture emerges for the Gini index
equation where Legal Origin 3 and Legal Origin 4 dummy
variables have co-efficients of -9.068 and -10.810 with
p values of 0.020 and 0.000, respectively. For the R10/P10
(% Women MPs) variables, only the co-efficient for the
Legal Origin 4 countries is significantly negative (positive)
at the 5% level.
An inspection of the co-efficients on the PC variables
indicates that only one significant value is observed. The
Creditor Rights variable (PC4) is positively associated
with the percentage of women MPs in a country (co-effi-
cient = 4.244, p value = 0.025). However, this may simply
reflect the fact that in Scandinavian countries, creditor rights
are protected to a greater extent and a larger percentage of
MPs are women. None of the other PC measures constructed
from the investor protection variables employed in La Porta
et al. can significantly explain the social indicators of the
countries being studied.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that three of the
regression equations have relatively high explanatory
power. Specifically, for the U5MR 01-04, Gini index and
% Women MPs, the R2 values are 0.71, 0.65 and 0.63,
respectively. The only equation with a very low level of
explanatory power is where Log Pr Pop is the dependent
variable; in this instance, the R2 is only 0.05 and none of
the co-efficient values are statistically different from zero.
Common and Civil Law Traditions, Corporate Law
and Concluding Comments
In assessing the impact of their own work, particularly in
the context of Berle and Means’ seminal identification of
the agency issue, La Porta et al. (2008) state that:
The last decade has witnessed an explosion of
research on corporate governance that uses the
investor protection framework. This research has
successfully replaced the traditional Berle–Means
conception of a public corporation with a much more
realistic for most of the world model of family-run
firms, pyramidal and group structures, and tremen-
dous conflicts between outside investors and con-
trolling shareholders. (p. 287)
However, La Porta et al. appear to be silent on Berle and
Means’ explicit critique of the common law tradition, and
its implications for their own assessment of the distinction
between corporate governance regimes under common and
civil legal traditions. More specifically, Berle and Means
reason that the nature of the modern corporation ‘‘calls for
analysis, not in terms of business enterprise but in terms of
social organization’’ because the corporation has become a
site of highly centralized power in which many interests are
at stake. Their discussion then centres on the historical
process by which power is challenged—as happened in
Table 5 A principal component analysis of the La Porta et al. investor protection variables
Variable pc1 pc2 pc3 pc4 pc5 pc6 pc7 pc8 pc9 pc10
ExCap/GNP 0.326 -0.438 0.002 -0.012 -0.034 0.272 0.715 0.228 -0.112 -0.225
AntiDir 0.454 -0.184 0.283 -0.187 -0.223 -0.230 0.044 -0.339 -0.122 0.641
Firms/Pop 0.369 0.051 0.489 0.217 -0.284 0.045 -0.320 -0.166 -0.164 -0.579
IPOs/Pop 0.401 0.065 0.246 -0.402 0.525 0.147 -0.194 0.247 0.466 -0.023
CredR 0.104 -0.229 0.077 0.792 0.440 0.148 -0.123 -0.005 0.007 0.271
Debt/GNP 0.233 -0.391 -0.401 0.152 -0.282 -0.451 -0.189 0.127 0.504 -0.140
GDP Growth -0.257 -0.409 0.274 -0.158 0.389 -0.593 -0.040 0.119 -0.342 -0.179
Log GNP 0.118 -0.377 -0.469 -0.265 0.194 0.339 -0.361 -0.412 -0.294 -0.121
1s1vote -0.288 -0.409 0.249 -0.104 -0.362 0.372 -0.362 0.474 -0.016 0.227
Rule of Law 0.403 0.292 -0.311 0.032 -0.002 -0.136 -0.180 0.566 -0.521 0.107
Eigenvalue 3.027 2.291 1.696 1.132 0.546 0.447 0.359 0.283 0.130 0.090
Proportion 0.303 0.229 0.170 0.113 0.055 0.045 0.036 0.028 0.013 0.009
Cumulative 0.303 0.532 0.701 0.815 0.869 0.914 0.950 0.978 0.991 1.000
Note: This table shows the output from applying a principal component analysis to the investor protection variables in the La Porta et al. study.
The top part of the table shows the weightings for the ten investor protection variables of each PC. The bottom part of the table highlights the
importance of each PC in explaining the investor protection variables. An explanation of the variables is provided in Table 1 and in Supplement
to Table 1b in Annex 1
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relation to the absolute religious power once wielded by the
church, and the slow process by which constitutional law
developed in the political context. Berle and Means do not
predict how the diverse groups which have an interest in
the operation of the corporation will resolve their interests;
but they do take a normative, as well as an analytic, per-
spective in considering future possibilities.
They base their suggestion that courts mediate among
competing organisational interests to serve society, on a
continuing historical process whereby concentrated power is
forced to accede to the wider interests of the polity (see also
Engelen 2002 and Gomez and Korine 2005). They argue that:
It is conceivable, - indeed it seems almost essential if
the corporate system is to survive, - that the ‘‘control’’
of the great corporations should develop into a purely
neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by
various groups in the community and assigning to
each a portion of the income stream on the basis of
public policy rather than private cupidity. (p. 313)19
They go on to reiterate the point about the historical
imperative whereby power is and should be challenged
whenever it becomes too concentrated—and with great
prescience they foresee the potential for corporations to
become so powerful that they can dominate the state. This
reinforces their central point that the control of such or-
ganisations should become a matter of constitutional
reform in the wider democratic and public interest, rather
than a vehicle for promoting the interest of powerful
groups.
Their views of the differing characteristics of a legal
framework which aims to balance the interests of all
members of society, and the common law which merely
seeks to defend ‘‘men in their own’’ are, we submit, of
great salience given the evidence adduced in this article of
the wider societal impacts which are associated with dif-
ferent legal traditions. It clearly leads to the conjecture that
civil law countries have achieved a better balancing of
claims by different ‘‘groups in the community’’ such that
their societies have lower levels of income inequality and
therefore of the social ills that are increasingly (and mea-
surably) recognised as its consequence.
We acknowledge that the lens provided by La Porta
et al. on the relationship between varieties of capitalism,
including legal traditions and related forms of corporate
governance, has been insightful. However, we would argue
that their restricted set of criteria for assessing prosperity
has obscured very important implications of aspects of
their work for wider society. In particular, their claims
regarding the relative superiority of the common law
approach to the ‘‘social control of economic life’’ are very
clearly contestable.
Our conclusion to this article can be stated succinctly.
Following the thrust of the Berle and Means’ analysis we
contend that the common law tradition is associated with the
spurious depoliticisation of issues that are central to political
mediation. And we have adduced evidence that the Anglo-
American common law tradition leads to social outcomes,
relative to those found in countries with a civil law tradition,
which should give cause for profound disquiet and prompt
the question of how such outcomes could be ameliorated. It
is in this context, we believe, that the wide influence of the
work of La Porta et al. is a matter for concern.
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Annex 1: Table supplements
Supplement to Table 1b: Description of the variables
CredR An index aggregating creditor rights. The index is
formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country imposes
restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum
dividends, to file for reorganization; (2) secured
creditors are able to gain possession of their security
once the reorganization petition has been approved (no
automatic stay); (3) the debtor does not retain the
administration of its property pending the resolution of
the reorganization; (4) secured creditors are ranked
first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from
the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. The
index ranges from 0 to 4.
Debt/GNP Ratio of the sum of bank debt of the private sector and




Average annual percent growth of per capita gross
domestic product for the period 1970–1993.
Log GNP Logarithm of Gross National Product in 1994.
1s1vote Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code of
the country requires that ordinary shares carry one vote
per share, and 0 otherwise. Equivalently, this variable
equals one when the law prohibits the existence of
both multiple-voting and non-voting ordinary shares
and does not allow firms to set a maximum number of
votes per shareholder irrespective of the number of
shares she owns, and 0 otherwise.
Rule of
Law
Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country.
Average of the months of April and October of the
monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0
to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and
order.
Supplement to Table 2
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